| Posted: 01/Sep/2010 at 12:02pm | IP Logged
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LOL, thanks Barnes, that QB must have replaced someone’s kid that works at the news station. What a commute! And doesn’t it just make those UIL rules look ridicules as well as the news coverage. Is it any wonder that the state is worried about a massive lawsuit and in 2003 a bill was gaining momentum in the state legislature “to abolish the existing UIL and replace it with a legitimate state agency”?
After looking at that tape it reminded me of something you might be able to ask the sup. I know this case was about the UIL and you are dealing with the district but it is applicable especially considering the more recent Findings of Fact and Law.
The UIL has no authority and school must show the purpose/need as well as rational basis for the policy.
“Even when the purpose of a statute is legitimate, equal protection analysis still requires a determination that the classifications drawn by the statute are rationally related to the statute's purpose [cite omitted]. Under the rational basis test of Sullivan, similarly situated individuals must be treated equally under the statutory classification unless there is a rational basis for not doing so.”
“”Texas courts are particularly sensitive to the problem of overinclusive and underinclusive classes. For example, in Sullivan v. Univ. Interscholastic League, 616 S.W.2d 170, 172-73 (Tex. 1981), the validity of an "anti-recruiting" rule for high school athletes was being challenged as violative of Art. 1, §3 of the Texas Constitution. There, the "anti-recruiting" rule prevented all student athletes transferring to different schools from playing sports for a year after the transfer. Because this rule was "overinclusive," our Supreme Court declared it unconstitutional:
"The transfer rule creates two classes of students: those who do not transfer from one school to another, as compared to those who transfer. The rule treats these two classes of students differently by permitting members of the first group to compete in interscholastic activities without any delay while imposing a one-year period of ineligibility on the second group. The purpose of the transfer rule was to discourage recruitment of high school athletes. This is a legitimate state purpose. However, equal protection analysis still requires us to ‘reach and determine the question whether the classifications drawn in a statute are reasonable in light of its purpose.' McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191, 85 S. Ct. 283, 13 L. Ed. 2d 222 (1964).
"In practical effect, the challenged classification simply does not operate rationally to deter recruitment. The U.I.L. rule is overbroad and over-inclusive. The rule burdens many high school athletes who were not recruited and were forced to move when their family moved for employment or other reasons. The fact that there is no means of rebutting the presumption that all transferring athletes have been recruited illustrates the capriciousness of the rule. The inclusion of athletes who have legitimately transferred with recruited athletes does not further the purpose of the transfer rule. Under strict equal protection analysis the classification must include all those similarly situated with respect to purpose. Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 86 S. Ct. 1497, 16 L. Ed. 2d 577 (1966). See Developments in the Law -- Equal Protection, 82 Harv. L. Rev. 1065, 1084 (1969). It is clear that the transfer rule broadly affects athletes who are not similarly situated."[12]
See also Bell v. Lone Oak Independent School District, 507 S.W.2d 636 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 1974).
In Whitworth v. Bynum, 699 S.W.2d 194, 197 (Tex. 1985), the Texas guest statute was challenged as violative of equal protection. Finding the law unconstitutional, our Supreme Court held:
"Even when the purpose of a statute is legitimate, equal protection analysis still requires a determination that the classifications drawn by the statute are rationally related to the statute's purpose [cite omitted]. Under the rational basis test of Sullivan, similarly situated individuals must be treated equally under the statutory classification unless there is a rational basis for not doing so. Although Bynum has argued that an overinclusive statute cannot be struck down under a rational relationship test, overinclusiveness was a determinative factor in Sullivan."
See also Prudential Health Care Plan, Inc. v. Comm. of Insurance, 626 S.W.2d 822, 830 (Tex.App.- Austin 1982).””
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